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Abstract: Certiﬁcate-based encryption was introduced in Eurocrypt’03 to solve the
certiﬁcate management problem in public key encryption. Recently, this idea was extended to certiﬁcate-based signatures. Several new schemes and security models of
certiﬁcate-based signatures have been proposed. In this paper, we ﬁrst take a closer
look at the certiﬁcate-based signature by comparing it with digital signatures in other
popular public key systems. We introduce a new security model of certiﬁcate-based
signature, which deﬁnes several new types of adversaries against certiﬁcate-based signatures, along with the security model of certiﬁcate-based signatures against them.
The new model is clearer and more elaborated compared with other existing ones. We
then investigate the relationship between certiﬁcate-based signatures and certiﬁcateless signatures, and propose a generic construction of certiﬁcate-based signatures. We
prove that the generic construction is secure (in the random oracle model) against all
types of adversaries deﬁned in this paper, assuming the underlying certiﬁcateless signatures satisfying certain security notions. Based on our generic construction, we are
able to construct new certiﬁcate-based signature schemes, which are more eﬃcient in
comparison with other schemes with similar security levels.
Key Words: certiﬁcate-based signatures, certiﬁcateless signatures, security model,
generic construction, concrete scheme
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This is the full version of our paper presented at WISA 2008 [Wu et al. 2008].
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1

Introduction

In a public-key cryptosystem, each user has a pair of keys: public key and private
key. The public key is always published and publicly accessible, while the private
key is kept secret by the owner. The central problem in a public key system is
to prove that a public key is genuine and authentic, and has not been tampered
with or replaced by a malicious third party. The usual approach to ensure the
authenticity of a public key is to use a certiﬁcate. A (digital) certiﬁcate is a
signature of a trusted certiﬁcate authority (CA) that binds together the identity
of an entity A, its public key P K and other information. This kind of systems
is referred as public key infrastructure (PKI). The PKI is generally considered
to be costly to use and manage.
Shamir [Shamir 1985] introduced the concept of identity-based public key
cryptography (or, ID-PKC for short), where the original motivation is to ease
certiﬁcate management in the e-mail system. A user’s public key in ID-PKC is
some unique information about the identity of the user (e.g., email address).
The private key in ID-PKC is generated by a trusted third party called Private
Key Generator (PKG) who holds a master key. Thus, key escrow is an inherent
problem in this kind of ID-PKC (e.g., [Shamir 1985, Boneh and Franklin 2001]),
as the PKG knows any user’s private key. The key escrow problem could be
partially solved by the introduction of multiple PKGs and the use of threshold
techniques, which requires extra communications and infrastructures.
Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed a new paradigm called certiﬁcateless public
key cryptography [Al-Riyami and Paterson 2003] (or, CL-PKC for short), where
the original motivation is to ﬁnd a public key system that does not require the
use of certiﬁcates and does not have the key escrow problem. Each entity in
CL-PKC holds two secrets: a secret value and a partial private key. The secret
value SV is generated by the entity itself, while a third party Key Generating
Center (KGC), holding a master key, generates the partial private key P P K
from the user’s identity information 2 . The entity’s actual private key is the
output of some function with the input SV and P P K. This way, KGC does
not know the actual private key and the key escrow problem is eliminated. The
entity can use the actual private key to generate the public key, which is no
longer only computed from the identity. This makes the certiﬁcateless system
non-identity-based. The entity’s public key could be available to other entities
2

In Section 5.1 of [Al-Riyami and Paterson 2003], the authors sketched an alternative
partial private key generation technique. In this paper, when we mention a cryptographic protocol in CL-PKC, we mean it is a protocol with the classic private key
generation technique used in Section 4.1 of [Al-Riyami and Paterson 2003], which
has been adopted by most researchers in CL-PKC.
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by transmitting it along with messages (for example, in a signing application)
or by placing it in a public directory (this would be more appropriate for an
encryption setting). However, there is no certiﬁcate to ensure the authenticity
of the entity’s public key in CL-PKC. Therefore, it is necessary to assume that
an adversary is able to replace the entity’s public key with a false key of its
choice, which is also known as key replacement attack [Huang et al. 2005]. One
assumption in CL-PKC is that KGC never mounts the key replacement attack.
In the traditional PKI, however, one does not need to make the same assumption
on the third party CA, who if replaces the entity’s public key with a false key
of its choice, can be implicitly proved due to the existence of the certiﬁcate for
that false key.
In Eurocrypt 2003, Gentry [Gentry 2003] introduced the notion of certiﬁcatebased encryption. As in the traditional PKI, each client generates its own public/private key pair and requests a certiﬁcate from the CA. The diﬀerence is that,
a certiﬁcate in the certiﬁcate-based cryptography, or more generally, a signature
from the third party acts not only as a certiﬁcate (as in the traditional PKI) but
also as a decryption key (as in ID-PKC and CL-PKC). The sender can encrypt a
message without obtaining explicit information other than the recipient’s public
key and the parameters of CA. To decrypt a message, a keyholder needs both
its secret key and an up-to-date certiﬁcate from its CA (or a signature from an
authority). Therefore, CA does not need to make the certiﬁcate status information available among the whole system, and only needs to contact the certiﬁcate
holder for revocation and update. As the sender is not required to verify the
certiﬁcate of the recipient’s public key, the sender could be duped to encrypt
messages with an uncertiﬁed public key. This could be due to the recipient has
not yet had his/her public key certiﬁed, or the encryption key that the sender
holds is not the recipient’s authentic public key. In this sense, certiﬁcate-based
encryption works in a similar way to certiﬁcateless encryption, but the diﬀerence
is that certiﬁcates do exist in certiﬁcate-based encryption.
Certiﬁcate-based cryptography was introduced to solve the certiﬁcate management problem in the traditional PKI, but only in the scenario of encryption. The notion of certiﬁcate-based encryption was extended to certiﬁcatebased signature in [Kang et al. 2004, Li et al. 2007]. However, as mentioned in
[Gentry 2003], if we only consider signing and veriﬁcation signatures in a public
key cryptosystem, then the certiﬁcate management problem is not as challenging as in the scenario of encryption and decryption. For example, the signer
can send its public key and the proof of certiﬁcate status to the veriﬁer simultaneously with its signature, thus the veriﬁer can obtain the certiﬁcate without referring to a public directory or issuing a third-party query to CA. This,
however, will require more bandwidth for signature transmitting. Public key
cryptosystems like ID-PKC [Shamir 1985, Boneh and Franklin 2001] and CL-
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PKC [Al-Riyami and Paterson 2003] can eliminate the certiﬁcate management
problem as one can directly use the entity A’s public key to verify signatures,
without checking the certiﬁcate of A’s public key. However, this is achieved at the
cost of assuming certain trust on the authority, who is able to impersonate any
user in an undetectable way. In certiﬁcate-based cryptosystem, certiﬁcate management problem can be eased in a diﬀerent way. To generate valid certiﬁcatebased signatures of a user with the identity information ID and the public key
P K, one needs two pieces of secret information, namely a valid certiﬁcate of
(ID, P K) and the secret key of P K. In other words, a valid certiﬁcate-based
signature ensures the existence of a valid certiﬁcate. Thus, the signer does not
need to send the certiﬁcate along with the message and the signature. This is
achieved at the cost of more computational operations in signature veriﬁcation,
which implies the veriﬁcation of the certiﬁcate. If one replaces P K with P K’
and generates a valid signature under ID and P K’, he/she must have a certiﬁcate of (ID, P K  ). This can prove that the third party CA is dishonest, as
there is only one party with the ability to generate certiﬁcates. Therefore, the
third party in certiﬁcate-based signatures has the Trust Level 3 in the deﬁnition
in [Girault 1991], which is similar as CA in the traditional PKI and a few constructions of identity-based signatures [Bellare et al. 2004, Galindo et al. 2006].
To summarize, (1) The authority in certiﬁcate-based signatures and traditional
PKI-based signatures is at Trust Level 3 in the deﬁnition given in [Girault 1991],
which is higher than the authority in the ID-PKC and the CL-PKC, and (2) To
ease the problem of certiﬁcate management, certiﬁcate-based signatures consume (in general) less bandwidth in signature transmitting but might require
more computational cost than traditional-PKI-based signatures.
1.1

Related Work

Kang, Park and Hahn proposed the notion and the ﬁrst construction of certiﬁcatebased signatures in [Kang et al. 2004], by extending the idea of certiﬁcate-based
encryption in [Gentry 2003]. That is, to generate a valid signature under the
public key P K, the entity needs to know both the corresponding private key
SK and the up-to-date certiﬁcate of P K. To verify a claimed signature, one
only needs the signer’s public key and the parameter of CA (particularly, no
need to check the certiﬁcate of that public key). As the veriﬁer is not required
to check the certiﬁcate about a claimed public key, key replacement attacks also
exist in certiﬁcate-based cryptography. Key replacement attacks in certiﬁcatebased signatures were ﬁrst addressed in [Kang et al. 2004] and formally deﬁned
in [Li et al. 2007]. As introduced in [Li et al. 2007], adversaries in certiﬁcatebased signatures can be divided into two types: CB-AI and CB-AII . CB-AI
can replace any entity’s public key P K with a new public key P K  chosen by
itself, and is trying to forge a valid signature under P K  whose certiﬁcate is not
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available to CB-AI . CB-AII has the knowledge of CA’s master key and thus
can generate the certiﬁcate for any user. CB-AII is trying to forge a valid signature under an entity’s authentic public key P K (that is, P K is chosen by that
entity), whose private key is not available to CB-AII . In addition to the security models, a certiﬁcate-based signature scheme secure against key replacement
attacks was also proposed in [Li et al. 2007]. Very recently, Liu et al. proposed
two new certiﬁcate-based signature schemes [Liu et al. 2008]. The ﬁrst one does
not require any pairing operation and the security of their second scheme can
be proved without random oracles. Some variants of certiﬁcate-based signatures
(e.g., certiﬁcate-based proxy signature [Kang et al. 2004] and certiﬁcate-based
linkable ring signature [Au et al. 2007B]) have also been proposed.
1.2

Motivations and Contributions

As mentioned in [Al-Riyami and Paterson 2003], certiﬁcate-based cryptography
and certiﬁcateless cryptography are quite similar and there could be a possible
method to convert a certiﬁcateless cryptographical protocol to a certiﬁcate-based
cryptographical protocol. In particular, there are four similarities in certiﬁcateless signatures and certiﬁcate-based signatures.
1. In both public key cryptosystems, signature signing requires two pieces of
secret information. In CL-PKC, one needs a partial private key and a secret
value of a public key to produce valid signatures under that public key.
Similarly, in certiﬁcate-based cryptosystem, one needs the certiﬁcate and
the private key of a public key to generate valid signatures under that public
key.
2. The partial private key is generated by KGC in CL-PKC. The certiﬁcate is
generated by Certiﬁer in certiﬁcate-based cryptosystem.
3. The secret value corresponding to a public key is chosen by the user in
CL-PKC. The private key is also chosen by the user in certiﬁcate-based
cryptosystem.
4. In both public key cryptosystems, explicit veriﬁcation of the authenticity of
a public key is not required when one veriﬁes the validity of signatures under
that public key.
Motivated by those similarities, we believe that certiﬁcate-based signatures and
certiﬁcateless signatures are closely related, and the investigation of the relationship between those two notions is worthwhile. The contributions of this paper
are twofold.
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1. New Security Models of Certificate-based Signatures
A reasonable and elaborated security model is necessary for constructing provably secure cryptographic protocols. For example, although the key replacement
attack has been widely accepted in certiﬁcateless cryptography, there is no consensus on the precise meaning of that term in the early research of certiﬁcateless cryptography and several certiﬁcateless signature schemes have been broken [Al-Riyami and Paterson 2003, Gorantla and Saxena 2005, Hu et al. 2006,
Huang et al. 2005, Park 2006, Yum and Lee 2004, Zhang and Feng 2006]. Although some security models [Kang et al. 2004, Li et al. 2007] have been proposed so far, the security deﬁnition of certiﬁcate-based signatures is not satisfactory, especially in the exact meaning of key replacement attacks. In this
paper, we provide elaborated deﬁnitions of certiﬁcate-based signatures, which
will allow us to establish a systematic approach for constructing and proving
secure certiﬁcate-based signature schemes. Our deﬁnitions are inspired by and
modiﬁed from the security notions in certiﬁcateless signatures. This is not only
because certiﬁcateless signatures and certiﬁcate-based signatures are analogous
in many ways, but also due to the fact that security deﬁnitions of certiﬁcateless
signatures have been formalized recently.
2. Generic Construction of Certificate-based Signatures from Certificateless Signatures
After giving new security models of certiﬁcate-based signatures, we propose a
generic construction of certiﬁcate-based signatures which is secure in the proposed models. We show how to build a certiﬁcate-based signature scheme from
a certiﬁcateless signature scheme, by treating partial private keys in certiﬁcateless signatures as certiﬁcates in certiﬁcate-based signatures. Our method can be
used to build certiﬁcate-based signature schemes secure (in the random oracle
model) against any type of adversaries deﬁned in this paper, assuming that the
underlying certiﬁcateless signature schemes satisfy certain security notions. We
also give two concrete examples of our generic construction and compare them
with other existing ones. From essentially the same idea, the generic construction
of certiﬁcate-based encryption from certiﬁcateless encryption has been proposed
in [Al-Riyami and Paterson 2005], but a recent work in [Kang and Park 2005]
shows a ﬂaw in the security proof of [Al-Riyami and Paterson 2005]. Our construction does not have that ﬂaw as we use diﬀerent techniques in the conversion.
Organization of Our Paper
The outline of a certiﬁcate-based signature (CBS) scheme is presented in the
next section, where the description of the oracles are also given. We then redeﬁne the security of CBS against diﬀerent types of attacks in Section 3. The
generic construction of certiﬁcate-based signatures from certiﬁcateless signatures
is proposed in Section 4. Section 5 demonstrates the application of our generic
construction by showing two concrete certiﬁcate-based signature schemes. Fi-
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nally, Section 6 concludes the paper.

2

Certiﬁcate-Based Signatures

In this section, we will ﬁrst review the deﬁnitions of certiﬁcate-based signatures.
Then, we will describe oracles used in our security model.
2.1

Syntax of Certiﬁcate-Based Signatures

In a certiﬁcate-based cryptosystem, a certiﬁcate generator, which is called as the
“certiﬁer”, will ﬁrst generate the system parameter and a master public/private
key pair. The certiﬁer will use that key pair to generate certiﬁcates for users
in the system. Users then will generate their own public/secret key pairs and
contact the certiﬁer to obtain the corresponding certiﬁcates. A user can use the
secret key and the certiﬁcate to generate a signature on a message. In this case,
that user is also called as the signer. A signature recipient is called as the veriﬁer
if he/she performs the signature veriﬁcation.
A certiﬁcate-based signature (CBS) scheme consists of the following ﬁve algorithms:
1. CB-Setup(1k ) → (CB-msk, CB-mpk, CB-params). By taking as input a
security parameter 1k , the certiﬁer runs the algorithm CB-Setup to generate
the certiﬁer’s master secret key CB-msk, master public key CB-mpk and
the system parameter CB-params. CB-params includes the description of
a string space Γ , which can be any subset of {0, 1}∗.
2. CB-UserKeyGen(CB-mpk, CB-params, ID) → (CB-SKID , CB-P KID ). The
user with the identity information ID runs the algorithm CB-UserKeyGen
to generate the user ID’s secret/public key pair (CB-SKID , CB-P KID ) ∈
SKCB × PKCB , by taking as input CB-mpk and CB-params. Here, SKCB
denotes the set of valid secret key values and PKCB denotes the set of valid
public key values.
3. CB-CertGen(CB-msk, CB-mpk, CB-params, ID, CB-P KID ) → CertID . The
certiﬁer runs the algorithm CB-CertGen to generate the certiﬁcate CertID ,
by taking as input CB-msk, CB-mpk, CB-params, ID and its public key
CB-P KID .
4. CB-Sign(m, CB-params, CB-mpk, ID, CertID , CB-SKID , CB-P KID ) → CBσ. The prospective signer runs the algorithm CB-Sign to generate the signature CB-σ, by taking as input a message m, CB-params, CB-mpk, the
user’s identity ID, its CertID and key pair (CB-SKID , CB-P KID ).
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5. CB-Verify(m, CB-σ, CB-mpk, CB-params, ID, CB-P KID ) → {true, f alse}.
Anyone can run the algorithm CB-Verify to check the validity of the signature.
By taking as input a message/signature pair (m, CB-σ), ID, CB-P KID , CBmpk, CB-params, this algorithm outputs true if CB-σ is ID’s valid signature
on m. Otherwise, this algorithm outputs f alse.
Correctness. Signatures generated by the algorithm CB-Sign can pass through
the veriﬁcation in CB-Verify. That is,
CB-Verify(m, CB-Sign(m, CB-params, CB-mpk, ID, CertID , CB-SKID ,
CB-P KID ), CB-mpk, CB-params, ID, CB-P KID ) = true.
2.2

Adversaries and Oracles

We now describe the oracles which will be used in the security model of certiﬁcatebased signatures in this paper. We ﬁrst give a brief description of adversaries in
certiﬁcate-based signatures. Formal deﬁnitions of these adversaries will be given
in Section 3.
The essential security of a certiﬁcate-based signature scheme requires that
one can generate a valid signature under the public key CB-P KID if and only
if having the knowledge of both CertID and CB-SKID . In other words, one
cannot generate a valid signature with only CertID or CB-SKID . As introduced
in [Li et al. 2007], adversaries in certiﬁcate-based signatures can be divided into
two types: CB-AI and CB-AII . Type I adversary CB-AI simulates the scenario
where the adversary (anyone except the certiﬁer) is allowed to replace public keys
of any entities, but is not allowed to obtain the target user’s certiﬁcate CertID .
Type II adversary CB-AII simulates a malicious certiﬁer who is able to produce
certiﬁcates but is assumed not to replace the target user’s public key. We will use
the following oracles to simulate potential attacking scenarios. In the remainder
of this paper, we write α ← β to denote the algorithmic action of assigning the
value β to α.
1. OCB−UserCreate : This oracle receives an input ID ∈ Γ and outputs the public
key of user ID. It maintains two lists L1P K and L2P K , which are initially
empty and are used to record the information for each user ID. L1P K ={(ID,
CB-SKID , CB-P KID )} provides the information about user ID’s secret key
and public key when it is created. L2P K ={(ID, CB-P K ID )} provides the
information of ID’s current public key, which is denoted as CB-P K ID .
(a) For a fresh input ID, the oracle runs the algorithms CB-UserKeyGen to
obtain the secret key CB-SKID and public key CB-P KID . It then adds
(ID, CB-SKID , CB-P KID ) to L1P K and (ID, CB-P K ID ) to L2P K where
CB-P K ID ← CB-P KID . After that, it outputs CB-P KID . In this case,
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ID is said to be created. Here we assume that other oracles (which will
be deﬁned later) only respond to the identity which has been created.
(b) Otherwise, ID has already been created. The oracle will search ID in
L1P K and return CB-P KID as the output.
2. OCB−PKReplace : For a public key replacement query (ID, CB-PK) ∈ Γ × PKCB ,
this oracle ﬁnds the user ID in the list L2P K , sets CB-P K ID ← CB-PK and
updates the corresponding pair with (ID, CB-P K ID ).
3. OCB−Corruption : This oracle takes as input a query ID. It browses the list L1P K
and outputs the secret key CB-SKID .
4. OCB−CertGen : For a certiﬁcate request for (ID, CB-PK) ∈ Γ ×PKCB , this oracle
runs the algorithm CB-CertGen and returns the certiﬁcate for (ID, CB-PK).
5. OCB−Sign : Considering diﬀerent levels of the signing power the challenger
may have, this oracle can be further divided into following three types:
(a) OCB−NormalSign : This oracle takes as input a query (ID, m), and outputs
a signature CB-σ such that true = CB−Verify(m, CB-σ, CB-params,
ID, CB-P KID , CB-mpk). Here CB-P KID is ID’s public key in the list
L1P K .
(b) OCB−StrongSign : This oracle takes as input a query (ID, m, coin), where m
denotes the message to be signed, and coin ∈ {1, 2}. It acts diﬀerently
according to the value of coin. If coin = 1, this oracle works the same as
OCB−NormalSign . Otherwise coin = 2, this oracle ﬁrst checks the list L1P K
and L2P K to obtain ID’s original public key CB-P KID and ID’s current
public key CB-P K ID . If CB-P K ID =CB-P KID , this oracle works as
same as OCB−NormalSign . Otherwise, OCB−StrongSign will ask the adversary
to supply the secret key CB-SK ID corresponding to CB-P K ID . After
that, this oracle uses CB-SK ID and the certiﬁcate for (ID,CB-P K ID ) to
generate the signature CB-σ, which will be returned as the answer.
(c) OCB−SuperSign : For a query (ID, m), this oracle ﬁrst ﬁnds ID’s current
public key CB-P K ID in L2P K . This oracle then outputs a signature
σ such that true = CB−Verify(m, σ, CB-params, ID, CB-P K ID , CBmpk).
Remark. A Type II adversary CB-AII , who simulates the malicious certiﬁer, is
not allowed to make any requests to OCB−CertGen .
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Security Models of Certiﬁcate-based Signatures

In this section, we will deﬁne security models of certiﬁcate-based signatures.
Our models follow the standard methods: each security notion is deﬁned by the
game between the adversary and the challenger, which consists of several oracles deﬁned in Section 2.2. In our deﬁnition, the notation {Q1 , Q2 , · · · , Qn } 
{O1 , O2 , · · · , On } denotes that “No query Q ∈ {Q1 , Q2 , · · · , Qn } can be submitted to any oracle O ∈ {O1 , O2 , · · · , On }. A (t, qUC , qP KR , qC , qCG , qS ) adversary
refers to the adversary who runs in polynomial time t, makes at most qUC queries
to OCB−UserCreate , qP KR queries to OCB−PKReplace , qC queries to OCB−Corruption , qCG
queries to OCB−CertGen , qS queries to OCB−Sign ∈ {OCB−NormalSign , OCB−StrongSign ,
OCB−SuperSign }.
The deﬁnition in this section is inspired by [Huang et al. 2007], which provides a new classiﬁcation of potential adversaries against certiﬁcateless signatures. The security models in [Huang et al. 2007] not only include previous security deﬁnitions of certiﬁcateless signatures, but also introduce new types of
adversaries. Following the deﬁnitions in [Huang et al. 2007], we classify the potential adversaries in certiﬁcate-based signatures according to their attack power.
They are Normal Adversary, Strong Adversary and Super Adversary. Combined
with the known type I adversary and type II adversary in certiﬁcate-based signatures, we now deﬁne the security of certiﬁcate-based signatures in diﬀerent
attack scenarios and relate them to prior deﬁnitions.
3.1

Security Against Normal Type I Adversary

We ﬁrst deﬁne the Normal Type I adversary in certiﬁcate-based signatures, which
is denoted as Normal-CB-AI . The essential attacking scenario of Normal-CBAI is that the adversary can obtain some message/signature pairs (mi , CB-σi )
which are generated by the target user using its own secret key and certiﬁcate.
Our deﬁnition described below is inspired by and modiﬁed from the deﬁnition of
Normal Type I adversary against certiﬁcateless signatures in [Huang et al. 2007].
Initial: The challenger runs the algorithm CB-Setup, returns CB-params and
CB-mpk to AI .
Queries: In this phase, AI can adaptively make requests to OCB−UserCreate ,
OCB−PKReplace , OCB−Corruption , OCB−CertGen , OCB−NormalSign .
Output: After all queries, AI outputs a forgery (m∗ , CB-σ ∗ , ID∗ ). Let CBP K ID∗ be the current public key of ID∗ in L2P K .
Restrictions: We say AI wins the game if the forgery satisﬁes the following
requirements: (1) true = CB−Verify(m∗ , CB-σ ∗ , CB-params, ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ ,
CB-mpk); (2) (ID∗ , m∗ )  OCB−NormalSign ; (3) (ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ )  OCB−CertGen
and (4) ID∗  OCB−Corruption .
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The success probability that an adaptive chosen message and chosen identity adversary Normal-CB-AI wins the above game is denoted as Succcma,cida
AI ,normal . We say
a certiﬁcate-based signature scheme is secure against a (t, qUC , qP KR , qC , qCG ,
qS ) Normal-CB-AI if Succcma,cida
AI ,normal is negligible.
Remark. Our deﬁnition is similar to that in [Li et al. 2007], but with two improvements. Firstly, we allow the adversary to replace any user’s public key,
while the adversary in [Li et al. 2007] can only replace the target user’s public
key. The other improvement is that the adversary in our model is allowed to
obtain certiﬁcates of (ID, CB-P K)s chosen by itself. This is diﬀerent from the
adversary in [Li et al. 2007] who can only obtain certiﬁcates of original public
keys generated by the challenger.
3.2

Security Against Strong Type I Adversary

In this section, we boost the attack power of Normal Type I adversary and
deﬁne the Strong Type I adversary: Strong-CB-AI . Strong-CB-AI is more
powerful than Normal-CB-AI in the sense that Strong-CB-AI can access the
oracle OCB−StrongSign . Apart from that, Strong-CB-AI is allowed to corrupt the
target user ID∗ ’s original secret key. The attacking scenario is similar to those
in certiﬁcateless signatures deﬁned in [Hu et al. 2006, Zhang et al. 2006], and is
formally deﬁned as below.
The game between the challenger and a Strong-CB-AI is very similar to
that deﬁned in Section 3.1, but with two diﬀerences: (1) In the phase Queries,
Strong-CB-AI have access to OCB−StrongSign rather than OCB−NormalSign and (2)
In Restrictions, (ID∗ , m∗ )  OCB−StrongSign and ID∗ can appear as a query to
OCB−Corruption .
The success probability that an adaptive chosen message and chosen identity
adversary Strong-CB-AI wins the above game is denoted as Succcma,cida
AI ,strong . We
say a certiﬁcate-based signature scheme is secure against a (t, qUC , qP KR , qC , qCG ,
qS ) Strong-CB-AI if Succcma,cida
AI ,strong is negligible.
3.3

Security Against Super Type I Adversary

In this section, we will deﬁne the Super Type I adversary, which is denoted as
Super-CB-AI . Super-CB-AI is more powerful than Strong-CB-AI (and hence,
more powerful than Normal-CB-AI ) in the sense that Super-CB-AI has access
to OCB−SuperSign . That is, Super-CB-AI is allowed to obtain a valid signature
under the public key chosen by itself without providing the corresponding secret
key, which makes it the strongest Type I adversary. This is similar to the Super
Type I adversary in certiﬁcateless signatures deﬁned in [Huang et al. 2007].
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The game between the challenger and a Super-CB-AI is very similar to that
deﬁned in Section 3.2, but with two diﬀerences: (1) In the phase Queries, SuperCB-AI is allowed to have access to OCB−SuperSign rather than OCB−StrongSign and
(2) In Restrictions, (ID∗ , m∗ )  OCB−SuperSign .
The success probability of an adaptively chosen message and chosen identity
adversary Super-CB-AI wins the above game is denoted as Succcma,cida
AI ,super . We say
a certiﬁcate-based signature scheme is secure against a (t, qUC , qP KR , qC , qCG ,
qS ) Super-CB-AI if Succcma,cida
AI ,super is negligible.
3.4

Security Against Type II Adversary

In certiﬁcate-based signatures, a type II adversary CB-AII simulates the certiﬁer who is equipped with the master secret key and might engage in adversarial activities like eavesdropping on signatures and making signing queries.
Similar to the type I adversary, CB-AII could be also classiﬁed into NormalCB-AII , Strong-CB-AII , Super-CB-AII , which has access to OCB−NormalSign ,
OCB−StrongSign , OCB−SuperSign , respectively. However, there is no need to particularly deﬁne Strong-CB-AII . OCB−StrongSign can answer queries either by using
OCB−NormalSign (then OCB−StrongSign is the same as OCB−NormalSign ), or signing the
message with the corresponding secret key provided by the adversary. Note that,
CB-AII has the master secret key, and thus can calculate any user’s certiﬁcate.
If he has the secret key as well, CB-AII can generate the signature by himself
and OCB−StrongSign becomes useless. Therefore, for a type II adversary CB-AII ,
it is suﬃcient to deﬁne only two types of adversaries, namely Normal-CB-AII
and Super-CB-AII . The deﬁnition of those two types of adversaries is described
as follows.
Initial: The challenger runs the algorithm CB-Setup and returns the system
parameters CB-params, master secret key CB-msk and master public key CBmpk to AII .
Queries: AII can adaptively make requests to OCB−UserCreate , OCB−PKReplace ,
OCB−Corruption and OCB−Sign , where OCB−Sign ∈ {OCB−NormalSign , OCB−SuperSign }.
Output: After all queries, AII outputs a forgery (m∗ , CB-σ ∗ , ID∗ ).
Restrictions: We say AII wins the game if the forgery satisﬁes the requirements
as following: (1) true ← CB−Verify(m, CB-σ ∗ , CB-params, ID∗ , CB-P KID∗ ,
CB-mpk). Here CB-P KID∗ is the original public key in L1P K ; (2) (ID∗ , m∗ ) 
OCB−Sign ; and (3) ID∗  OCB−Corruption .
The success probability that an adaptive chosen message and chosen identity
adversary CB-AII wins the above game is denoted as Succcma,cida
AII ,type , where type ∈
{normal, super}. We say a certiﬁcate-based signature scheme is secure against
CB−Sign
will
a (t, qUC , qP KR , qC , qS ) CB-AII if Succcma,cida
AII ,type is negligible. Here, O
CB−NormalSign
CB−Sign
CB−SuperSign
be O
if type = normal. Otherwise, O
is O
.
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Security Against Malicious-but-Passive Type II Adversary

We now deﬁne a more powerful type II adversary, who is allowed to generate
the system parameter and the master secret/public key. This assumes that the
third party certiﬁer have already been malicious at the very beginning of the
setup stage of the system, rather than being only given the parameter and the
master secret/public key honestly generated by the challenger. Such attacks are
ﬁrst introduced to certiﬁcateless cryptosystems in [Au et al. 2007A]. In addition
to this, even though we say that the certiﬁer is malicious, we also assume (as
in [Au et al. 2007A]) that the certiﬁer is passive, in the sense that the certiﬁer would not actively replace the user’s public key or corrupt the user’s secret key. It is shown in [Au et al. 2007A] that the malicious-but-passive third
party KGC in certiﬁcateless cryptosystems like [Al-Riyami and Paterson 2003]
can have its master key pair speciﬁcally generated so that all the encrypted
messages for the target victim can also be decrypted by the KGC. The security
model of certiﬁcate-based encryption in [Gentry 2003] also captures the essence
of those attacks. The security of certiﬁcate-based signatures against a maliciousbut-passive Type II adversary is deﬁned by the following game:
Initial: The challenger executes AII on the security parameter 1k . AII returns
the system parameters CB-params and master public key CB-mpk.
Queries: A malicious-but-passive AII can make queries to all oracles except OCB−CertGen . Since CB-params and CB-mpk are generated by AII ,
OCB−UserCreate and OCB−PKReplace have to be modiﬁed as following:
OCB−UserCreate : As deﬁned in Sec. 2.2, this oracle receives an input ID ∈
Γ and outputs the public key CB-P KID . After obtaining CB-P KID ,
a malicious-but-passive Type II adversary must provide ID’s certiﬁcate
CertID for (ID, CB-P KID ). This oracle then adds (ID, CB-SKID , CBP KID , CertID ) to L1P K , and (ID, CB-P KID , CertID ) to L2P K .
OCB−PKReplace : For a malicious-but-passive Type II adversary, the input to
this oracle should be (ID, CB-PK, Cert) where Cert is the corresponding
certiﬁcate of CB-PK under the identity ID. This oracle searches L2P K ,
ﬁnds a record related to ID and sets CB-P K ID ← CB-PK and CertID ←
Cert. It then updates the related tuple with (ID, CB-P K ID , CertID ).
Output and Restrictions: Same as those deﬁned in Sec. 3.4.
The success probability that an adaptive chosen message and chosen identity
malicious-but-passive Type II adversary CB-AII wins the above game is denoted
as Succcma,cida
MP −AII ,type , where type ∈ {normal, super}. We say a certiﬁcate-based
signature scheme is secure against a (t, qUC , qP KR , qC , qS ) malicious-but-passive
CB−Sign
will be OCB−NormalSign
CB-AII if Succcma,cida
MP −AII ,type is negligible. Here, O
CB−Sign
CB−SuperSign
if type = normal. Otherwise, O
is O
.
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Generic Construction of Certiﬁcate-based Signatures

In this section, we will introduce a generic method to construct certiﬁcate-based
signatures. Our construction is based on certiﬁcateless signatures whose description is as below.
4.1

Syntax of Certiﬁcateless Signatures

A certiﬁcateless signature (CLS) scheme is deﬁned by six algorithms: CL-Setup
(generates KGC’s key pair (CL-msk, CL-mpk) and system’s parameter), CLPPKExtract (generates a user ID’s partial private key CL-P P K ID ), CL-SSValue
(generates a user ID’s secret value CL-SVID ), CL-SPKey (generates a user ID’s
public key CL-P KID ), CL-Sign (generates a certiﬁcateless signature CL-σ using
CL-P P K ID and CL-SVID ) and CL-Verify (outputs true if a given signature
is valid, or f alse otherwise). As one can see, to distinguish from the identity
information in the certiﬁcate-based system (which is denoted as ID), we use
the notion ID to denote the identity information in the certiﬁcateless system.
For other notations, we put the preﬁx “CL-” to indicate that they are in the
certiﬁcateless cryptosystem. Please refer to [Huang et al. 2007] for the formal
deﬁnition of each algorithm.
4.2

Generic Construction: CLS-2-CBS

In this section, we show how to convert a certiﬁcateless signature scheme into
a certiﬁcate-based signature scheme. In our construction, we need a hash function H : Γ × PKCB → IDCL . Here, Γ is the identity information space in the
certiﬁcate-based system, PKCB is the public key space in certiﬁcate-based system
and IDCL denotes the space of identities in the certiﬁcateless cryptosystem3 .
Let CLS be the certiﬁcateless signature scheme described in Section 4.1. We
now describe the generic construction CLS-2-CBS.
1. CB-Setup(1k ) → (CB-msk, CB-mpk, CB-params).
(a) Run algorithm CL-Setup(1k ) of CLS to obtain CL-params, CL-msk and
CL-mpk. For the security parameter k, we assume that the public key
size in a certiﬁcateless cryptosystem is at least 2k ;
(b) Set CB-params by extending CL-params to include the description of
Γ;
3

Here, we use the hash function H to “connect” two identities in certiﬁcatebased signatures and certiﬁcateless signatures. This is diﬀerent from the technique in the generic construction of certiﬁcate-based encryption proposed
in [Al-Riyami and Paterson 2005]. A recent work [Kang and Park 2005] pointed out
a ﬂaw of security proof in [Al-Riyami and Paterson 2005]. That ﬂaw does not exist
in our construction, the details of which will be shown in the security proof later.
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(c) (CB-msk, CB-mpk) ← (CL-msk, CL-mpk).
2. CB-UserCreate(CB-mpk, CB-params, ID ∈ Γ ) → (CB-SKID , CB-P KID ).
(a) CL-mpk ← CB-mpk;
(b) Extract CL-params from CB-params;
(c) CB-SKID ← CL-SSValue(CL-mpk, CL-params);
(d) CB-P KID ← CL-SPKey(CL-mpk, CL-params, CB-SKID ).
3. CB-CertGen(CB-msk, CB-mpk, CB-params, ID ∈ Γ, CB-P KID )→ CertID .
(a) (CL-msk, CL-mpk)←(CB-msk, CB-mpk);
(b) Extract CL-params from CB-params;
(c) H(ID, CB-P KID )→ ID ∈ IDCL ;
(d) CertID ← CL-PPKExtract(CL-msk, CL-mpk, CL-params, ID).
4. CB-Sign(m, CB-params, CB-mpk, ID, CertID , CB-SKID , CB-P KID ) → CBσ.
(a) Extract CL-params from CB-params;
(b) CL-mpk← CB-mpk;
(c) H(ID, CB-P KID )→ ID ∈ IDCL ;
(d) (CL-SV ID , CL-P K ID )←(CB-SKID , CB-P KID ) and CL-P P K ID ←
CertID ;
(e) CB-σ ←CL-Sign(m, CL-params, CL-mpk, ID, CL-SV ID , CL-P KID ,
CL-P P K ID ). One can see that the signature size of CB-σ is the same
as that in the underlying certiﬁcateless signature scheme.
5. CB-Verify(CB-params, CB-mpk, ID, CB-P KID , (m, CB-σ)) → {true,
f alse}.
(a) Extract CL-params from CB-params;
(b) CL-mpk ← CB-mpk;
(c) H(ID, CB-P KID )→ ID ∈ IDCL ;
(d) CL-P K ID ← CB-P KID ;
(e) CL-σ ← CB-σ.
(f) Output CL-Verify(CL-mpk, CL-params, ID, CL-P K ID , (m, CL-σ)).
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Correctness. We show that any certiﬁcate-based signature produced by CBSign will pass through the veriﬁcation in CB-Verify.
In our construction, a certiﬁcate-based signature is the output of the algorithm CL-Sign in the certiﬁcateless system, and algorithm CB-Verify also employs
the veriﬁcation algorithm CL-Verify in the certiﬁcateless system. To show the correctness of our construction, it suﬃces to show that under the same CL-params
and CL-mpk, a certiﬁcateless signature produced by using the secret value CLSV ID and the partial private key CL-P P K ID will pass through the check using
the corresponding identity ID and its public key CL-P KID . This is ensured by
the correctness of the underlying certiﬁcateless signature scheme, that is, for any
signature CL-σ produced by CL-Sign(m, CL-params, CL-mpk, ID, CL-SV ID ,
CL-P KID , CL-P P K ID ), CL-Verify(CL-mpk, CL-params, ID, CL-P K ID , (m,
CL-σ)) will output true. Therefore, for any signature output by CB-Sign deﬁned
in our construction, the algorithm CB-Verify will always output true.
Security Analysis
Theorem 1. [Security of CLS-2-CBS] CLS-2-CBS is secure (in the random oracle model) against adversaries defined in Section 3, assuming the underlying
certificateless signature scheme CLS satisfying certain security requirements.
The proof of Theorem 1 consists of several lemmas, which demonstrate the security relationship between our generic construction CLS-2-CBS and its underlying
certiﬁcateless signature scheme CLS. Please refer to [Huang et al. 2007] for security deﬁnitions of CLS.
Lemma 2 Security against Normal-CB-AI . CLS-2-CBS is secure (in the
random oracle model) against Normal-CB-AI defined in Section 3.1, if CLS is
secure against Normal-CL-AI defined in [Huang et al. 2007].
Proof. In the proof, we will regard hash function H as the random oracle and
show that if there is a Normal-CB-AI who can forge a valid certiﬁcate-based signature of CLS-2-CBS with non-negligible probability, then there exists a NormalCL-AI who can use Normal-CB-AI to forge a valid certiﬁcateless signature of
CLS with almost the same probability.
In our proof, the challenger of a Normal-CB-AI is the Normal-CL-AI against
the underlying CLS, who can make requests to its own challenger CL-Challenger.
CL-Challenger is made up of several oracles as follows: OCL−UserCreate (creates
users in the certiﬁcateless cryptosystem), OCL−Corruption (returns secret values
of created users), OCL−PPKExtract (returns partial private keys of created users),
OCL−PKReplace (replaces public keys of created users with the value provided by
the adversary) and OCL−NormalSign (returns certiﬁcateless signatures on messages
chosen by the adversary). Please refer to [Huang et al. 2007] for the formal definition of each oracle. The description of our proof is as follows.
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Initial: The CL-Challenger runs the algorithm CL-Setup of CLS and feeds the
Normal-CL-AI with CL-mpk and CL-params. Normal-CL-AI then returns CBmpk and CB-params to Normal-CB-AI where CB-mpk is deﬁned to be CL-mpk
and CB-params is deﬁned by extending CL-params to include the description of
Γ . Before Normal-CB-AI submits any queries, Normal-CL-AI asks CL-Challenger
to create quc users in the certiﬁcateless cryptosystem. Here quc is the number of
queries Normal-CB-AI issues to OCB−UserCreate . Normal-CL-AI then records the
information as (IDi , CL-P KIDi ), i = 1, 2, · · · , quc in the list CLP K . Here IDi ∈
IDCL , CL-P KIDi is the original public key of IDi in certiﬁcateless system.
Queries: As deﬁned in Section 3.1, Normal-CB-AI can issue queries to following
oracles. We now show how Normal-CL-AI can answer these queries.
– RO: In the proof, the hash function H is viewed as the random oracle RO.
For a fresh input (ID,CB-PK) ∈ Γ × PKCB , the output of RO is a random
element ID in IDCL . Normal-CL-AI maintains a list LRO consisting of
(ID,CB-PK,ID).
– OCB−UserCreate : At any time Normal-CB-AI can request to create the user
IDi ∈ Γ and expect to obtain IDi ’s public key CB-P KIDi . In response to
such queries:
1. For the ith fresh query IDi , Normal-CL-AI ﬁrst checks the list CLP K
and ﬁnds the ith pair (IDi , CL-P KIDi ). Normal-CL-AI then sets CBP KIDi ← CL-P KIDi , H(IDi , CB-P KIDi ) = IDi and adds (IDi , CBP KIDi , IDi ) into LRO . If (IDi , CB-P KIDi ) already appears in LRO , then
the simulation fails and Normal-CL-AI aborts. This, however, happens
only with negligible probability as |PKCL | is assumed to be greater than
2k and k is the security parameter. Otherwise, it adds (IDi , ⊥, CBP KIDi ) into the list L1P K . Meanwhile, it sets CB-P K IDi ← CB-P KIDi
and adds (IDi , CB-P K IDi ) into list L2P K . Here, the notation ⊥ means
that Normal-CL-AI does not know the corresponding secret key CBSKIDi .
2. In addition to maintain L1P K , L2P K , Normal-CL-AI will keep two additional lists L1ID and L2ID which will help it answer queries from
Normal-CB-AI . L1ID consists of pairs with the form (IDi , IDi ) where
IDi ∈ Γ and IDi ∈ IDCL . This list will help Normal-CL-AI to respond
Normal-CB-AI ’s corruption queries and NormalSign queries. L2ID consists of pairs with the form (IDi , IDi ) where IDi ∈ Γ and IDi ∈ IDCL .
In diﬀerent phases, IDi could be the identity IDi in the list L1P K , or
the identity IDi ∈ IDCL created at some time later.
For a user IDi created in this oracle, Normal-CL-AI will add (IDi , IDi )
into list L1ID , where IDi ∈ IDCL is IDi ’s corresponding identity in
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the list CLP K . Meanwhile, Normal-CL-AI sets IDi ← IDi and adds
(IDi , IDi ) into list L2ID .
– OCB−PKReplace : At any time Normal-CB-AI can replace a public key of a

created user ID with the public key CB-P KID
chosen by himself. In response,
$


Normal-CL-AI ﬁrst sets CB-P K ID ← CB-P KID
, then

1. Normal-CL-AI browses the list L2P K and rewrites the related pair as
(ID, CB-P K ID ). It then browses LRO .
2. If (ID, CB-P K ID ) appears in LRO in the tuple (ID, CB-P K ID , ID),
Normal-CL-AI will make a user-create query ID to CL-Challenger if ID
has not been created in the certiﬁcateless system. After that, Normal-CLAI replaces ID’s certiﬁcateless public key with CB-P K ID and updates
the corresponding pair in CLP K with (ID, CB-P K ID ). Finally, NormalCL-AI browses the list L2ID and updates the related pair with (ID, ID).
3. Otherwise, Normal-CL-AI sets H(ID,CB-P K ID )=ID, which is randomly
chosen in IDCL . It then adds (ID, CB-P K ID , ID) into LRO . After that,
Normal-CL-AI asks CL-Challenger to create the user ID. After creating
the identity ID, Normal-CL-AI replaces ID’s public key with CB-P K ID .
Normal-CL-AI then updates CLP K by adding (ID, CB-P K ID ). Finally,
Normal-CL-AI browses the list L2ID and updates the related pair with
(ID, ID).
– OCB−Corruption : At any time Normal-CB-AI can request the secret key of a
created user IDi . In response, Normal-CL-AI checks the list L1ID and ﬁnds
(IDi , IDi ). Then, it issues a corruption request IDi to CL-Challenger who will
return CL-SVIDi to Normal-CL-AI , where CL-SVIDi is the secret value of
IDi when it was created in the certiﬁcateless system. At last, Normal-CL-AI
sets CB-SKIDi ← CL-SVIDi , returns it to Normal-CB-AI and updates the
information in the list L1P K as (IDi , CB-SKIDi , CB-P KIDi ).
Correctness: This oracle should return the user IDi ’s original secret key
CB-SKIDi when the user was created. Recall that L1ID contains pairs
(IDi , IDi ) i = 1, 2, · · · , quc , where IDi ∈ IDCL is the IDi ’s initial corresponding identity in certiﬁcateless system. IDi is set as H(IDi ,CB-P KIDi )
and CL-P KIDi =CB-P KIDi which is the original public key of IDi . Thus the
secret value CL-SVIDi of IDi in certiﬁcateless system is the same as the
secret key CB-SKIDi of IDi in certiﬁcate-based system.
– OCB−CertGen : At any time Normal-CB-AI can request the certiﬁcate of (ID,
CB-PK) where CB-PK is chosen by the adversary itself. Normal-CL-AI will
try to ﬁnd an identity ID ∈ IDCL , whose partial private key is ID’s certiﬁcate
under the public key CB-PK. To do that, Normal-CL-AI will check LRO :
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1. If (ID, CB-PK) appears in LRO in the tuple (ID, CB-PK, ID), NormalCL-AI will make a user-create query ID to CL-Challenger if ID has not
been created in certiﬁcateless system.
2. Otherwise, Normal-CL-AI sets H(ID,CB-PK)=ID, which is randomly
chosen in IDCL . It then adds (ID, CB-PK, ID) into LRO . After that,
Normal-CL-AI asks CL-Challenger to create the user ID.
For either case, Normal-CL-AI issues the partial private key query ID to
CL-Challenger who will return the partial private key CL-P P KID . At last,
Normal-CL-AI sets CertID ← CL-P P KID and returns it to Normal-CB-AI .
– OCB−NormalSign : At any time, Normal-CB-AI can request the signature of
(mi , IDi ). The Normal-CL-AI ﬁrst ﬁnds the pair (IDi , IDi ) in the list L1ID .
Then, Normal-CL-AI issues a certiﬁcateless signing query (IDi , mi ). As deﬁned, Normal-CL-AI will obtain the signature CL-σi such that true = CLVerify(CL-mpk, CL-params, IDi , CL-P KIDi , (mi , CL-σi )). Normal-CB-AI
will set CB-σi ← CL-σi , and return CB-σi as the answer.
Correctness: Recall that for the pair (IDi , IDi ) in L1ID , IDi is set as
H(IDi ,CB-P KIDi ) and CB-P KIDi = CL-P KIDi . Here, CB-P KIDi is IDi ’s
original public key in the list L1P K . Therefore, true =CB-Verify(CB-params,
CB-mpk, IDi , CB-P KIDi , (mi , CB-σi )). That is, CB-σi is IDi ’s valid signature for mi under the original public key returned from OCB−UserCreate .
Output: After all queries, CB-AI will output a forgery (m∗ , CB-σ ∗ , ID∗ ). If
Normal-CB-AI wins game, then:
1. true = CB−Verify(m∗ , CB-σ ∗ , CB-params, ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ , CB-mpk),
where (ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ ) is in the list L2P K . Here, CB-P K ID∗ is ID∗ ’s current
public key.
That is, if CL-σ ∗ ← CB-σ ∗ , true = CL-Verify(CL-mpk, CL-params, ID∗ ,
CL-P K ID∗ , (m∗ , CL-σ ∗ )). Here, (ID∗ , ID∗ ) ∈ L2ID which indicates that
CL-P K ID∗ =CB-P K ID∗ .
2. (ID∗ , m∗ )  OCB−NormalSign .
That is, (ID∗ , m∗ ) has never been asked to OCL−NormalSign of CLS.
3. (ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ )  OCB−CertGen .
That is, ID∗ has never been asked to OCL−PPKExtract of CLS.
4. ID∗  OCB−Corruption .
That is, ID∗ has never been asked to OCL−Corruption of CLS.
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If Normal-CL-AI does not fail in the simulation, then it can output a valid
forgery (m∗ , CL-σ ∗ , ID∗ ) of the underlying certiﬁcateless signature scheme with
the same success probability as Normal-CB-AI . Considering that Normal-CL-AI
could only fail in simulating H as the random oracle, which only happens with
negligible probability qUC /2k (qUC is the number of user-create queries). Thus,
Normal-CL-AI wins the game with almost the same probability as Normal-CBAI . This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Security against Strong-CB-AI and Super-CB-AI .
One can use almost the same technique to prove that our generic construction is
secure against Strong-CB-AI (or, Super-CB-AI ), if the underlying certiﬁcateless
signature scheme is also secure against Strong-CL-AI (or, Super-CL-AI ) deﬁned
in [Huang et al. 2007]. The details are thus omitted here.
Lemma 3 Security against CB-AII . CLS-2-CBS is secure (in the random oracle model) against type II adversary CB-AII defined in Section 3.4, if CLS is
secure against CL-AII .
Proof. In the proof, we will regard the hash function H as the random oracle and
show that if there is a CB-AII (either Normal-CB-AII or Super-CB-AII ) who
can forge a valid certiﬁcate-based signature of CLS-2-CBS with non-negligible
probability, then there exists a CL-AII (correspondingly, Normal-CL-AII , or
Super-CL-AII ) who can use CB-AII to forge a valid certiﬁcateless signature
of CLS with almost the same probability.
In our proof, the challenger of a CB-AII is the CL-AII against the underlying
certiﬁcateless signature scheme, who can make requests to its own challenger CLChallenger. The description of our proof is as follows.
Initial: The CL-Challenger runs the algorithm CL-Setup of CLS and feeds the CLAII with CL-msk, CL-mpk and CL-params. CL-AII then returns (CB-msk,
CB-mpk) and CB-params to CB-AII where (CB-msk, CB-mpk) is deﬁned to
be (CL-msk, CL-mpk) and CB-params is deﬁned by extending CL-params to
include the description of Γ . Before CB-AII submits any queries, CL-AII asks
CL-Challenger to create quc users in the certiﬁcateless cryptosystem. Here quc is
the number of queries CB-AII issues to OCB−UserCreate . CL-AII then records the
information as (IDi , CL-P KIDi ), i = 1, 2, · · · , quc in the list CLP K . Here IDi ∈
IDCL , CL-P KIDi is the original public key of IDi in certiﬁcateless system.
Queries: As deﬁned in Section 3.4, CB-AII can issue queries to OCB−UserCreate ,
OCB−PKReplace , OCB−Corruption , OCB−NormalSign (or, OCB−SuperSign ). These oracles are
simulated by CL-AII in the same way as described in the proof of the security
against Type I adversary in Lemma 2.
Output: After all queries, CB-AII will output a forgery (m∗ , CB-σ ∗ , ID∗ ). If
CB-AII wins, then:
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1. true = CB−Verify(m∗ , CB-σ ∗ , CB-params, ID∗ , CB-P KID∗ , CB-mpk),
where (ID∗ , CB-P KID∗ ) is in the list L1P K , that is, CB-P KID∗ is ID∗ ’s
original public key.
That is, if CL-σ ∗ ← CB-σ ∗ , true = CL-Verify(CL-mpk, CL-params, ID∗ ,
CL-P KID∗ , (m∗ , CL-σ ∗ )), where (ID∗ , ID∗ ) ∈ L1ID .
2. (ID∗ , m∗ )  OCB−Sign .
That is, (ID∗ , m∗ ) has never been asked to OCL−Sign of CLS.
3. ID∗  OCB−Corruption .
That is, ID∗ has never been asked to OCL−Corruption of CLS.
If CL-AII does not fail in the simulation, then it can output a valid forgery (m∗ ,
CL-σ ∗ , ID∗ ) of the underlying certiﬁcateless signature scheme with the same
success probability as CB-AII . As in the proof of Lemma 2, CL-AII could only
fail in simulating H as the random oracle, which only happens with negligible
probability qUC /2k (qUC is the number of user-create queries). Thus, CL-AII
wins the game with almost the same probability as CB-AII . This completes the
proof of Lemma 3.
Security Against Malicious-but-Passive Type II Adversary.
One can use almost the same technique to prove that our generic construction
is secure against malicious-but-passive CB-AII , if the underlying certiﬁcateless
signature scheme is also secure against malicious-but-passive CL-AII deﬁned
in [Huang et al. 2007]. The details are thus omitted here.

5

Concrete Examples of CLS-2-CBS

By applying CLS-2-CBS to concrete certiﬁcateless signature schemes, we can
obtain several new constructions of certiﬁcate-based signatures. This section
will describe two of them, which are constructed from certiﬁcateless signature
schemes proposed in [Huang et al. 2007]. We start by reviewing the bilinear
groups and the complexity assumption in [Huang et al. 2007].
5.1

Bilinear Groups and Security Assumptions

Let G1 denote an additive group of prime order p and GT be a multiplicative
group of the same order. Let P denote a generator in G1 . Let e : G1 × G1 → GT
be a bilinear mapping with the following properties:
– The map e is bilinear: e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)ab for all P, Q ∈ G1 , a, b ∈ ZZp .
– The map e is non-degenerate: e(P, P ) = 1GT .
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– The map e is eﬃciently computable.
We say that (G1 , GT ) are bilinear groups if there exists the bilinear mapping
e : G1 × G1 → GT as above, and e, and the group action in G1 and GT can be
computed eﬃciently.
Deﬁnition 4. Computational Diﬃe-Hellman (CDH) Problem in G1 .
Given (P, aP, bP ), for some unknown a, b ∈ ZZp , compute abP .
The success probability of any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A in
solving CDH problem in G1 is deﬁned to be SuccCDH
A,G1 = Pr[A(P, aP, bP ) = abP ]
where the probability is over the random choice of a, b ∈ ZZp and the random
bits consumed by A.
5.2

Scheme I

The scheme described in this section is based on the certiﬁcateless signature
scheme in Section 4.2 of [Huang et al. 2007]. It consists of following algorithms.
– CB-Setup: Let (G1 , GT ) be bilinear groups where |G1 | = |GT | = p, for
some prime number p ≥ 2k , where k is the system security number. e denotes the bilinear mapping G1 × G1 → GT . Let H0 , H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1
and H2 : Γ × G∗1 → ID be three secure cryptographic hash functions,
where Γ is the set of identity information in the certiﬁcate-based system
and ID is the identity space deﬁned in [Huang et al. 2007]. The certiﬁer
chooses a random number s ∈ ZZ∗p and a generator P of G∗1 . The certiﬁer then calculates system’s master public key CB-mpk= sP , where s is
the master secret key CB−msk. The system’s parameter CB-params is
{G1 , GT , p, e, P, H0 , H1 , H2 , CB-mpk, Γ }.
– CB-UserCreate: The user ID chooses a random number xID ∈ ZZ∗p and sets xID
as the secret key. Here the valid secret key value space is SKCB = ZZ∗p . User
ID can also calculate the public key CB-P KID = xID P . Here the valid public
key space is PKCB = G∗1 .
– CB-CertGen: Given a user’s identity information ID, the certiﬁer ﬁrst sets
ˆ = H2 (IDCB-P KID ), then computes CertID = sH0 (ID).
ˆ
ID
ˆ = H2 (IDCB-P KID ) and
– CB-Sign: For a message m, the user ID sets ID
ˆ
computes the signature CB-σ = CertID + xID H1 (mIDCB-P
KID).
– CB-Verify: Given a pair (m, σ) and user ID’s public key CB-P KID , after
?
ˆ = H2 (IDCB-P KID), anyone can check whether e(CB-σ, P ) =
setting ID
ˆ
ˆ
e(H0 (ID),CB-mpk)e(H
1 (mIDCB-P KID ), CB-P KID ). If the equality holds,
this algorithm outputs true. Otherwise, this algorithm outputs f alse.
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Theorem 5 Security of Concrete Scheme I. Scheme I is secure (in the random oracle model) against Normal-CB-AI and Super-CB-AII adaptive chosen
message and chosen identity attacks, assuming that CDH problem is hard in G1 .
Proof. The correctness of this theorem is due to Theorem 1 and the underlying certiﬁcateless signature scheme is provably secure (in the random oracle
model) against Normal-CL-AI and Super-CL-AII if CDH problem is hard in
G1 [Huang et al. 2007].
5.3

Scheme II

The scheme described in this section is based on the certiﬁcateless signature
scheme in Section 4.3 of [Huang et al. 2007]. The ﬁrst four algorithms are the
same as those deﬁned in Section 5.2, with the only diﬀerence that H1 is deﬁned
as {0, 1}∗ → ZZp . The CB-Sign and CB-Verify algorithms are described as follows:
ˆ = H2 (IDCB-P KID ) and
– CB-Sign: For a message m, the user ID sets ID
computes the signature σ = (u, v, W ) where
ˆ
KID r1 P e(P, P )r2 ) for random numbers r1 , r2 ∈
• u = H1 (mIDCB-P
ZZp chosen by user ID; and
• v = r1 − uxID (mod p), W = r2 P − uCertID .
– CB-Verify: Given a message/signature pair (m, σ = (u, v, W )), ID’s public key
ˆ = H2 (IDCB-P KID ) anyone can check whether
CB−P KID , by setting ID
?
ˆ
ˆ u ).
u = H1 (mID CB-P KID vP + uCB-P KIDe(W, P )e(CB−mpk, H0 (ID))

If the equality holds, this algorithm outputs true. Otherwise, this algorithm
outputs f alse.

Theorem 6 Security of Concrete Scheme II. Scheme II is secure (in the
random oracle model) against Super-CB-AI and Super-CB-AII adaptive chosen
message and chosen identity attacks, assuming that CDH problem is hard in G1 .
Proof. The correctness of this theorem is due to Theorem 1 and the underlying certiﬁcateless signature scheme is provably secure (in the random oracle model) against Super-CL-AI and Super-CL-AII if CDH problem is hard in
G1 [Huang et al. 2007].
Remark. Scheme II is the ﬁrst certiﬁcate-based signature scheme which is provably secure against Super Type I and Type II adversary.
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Table 1: Eﬃciency Comparison
Scheme
Length Signing Cost Verification Cost
CBS in [Li et al. 2007]
2|G1 |
3E+2P A
4BM
Scheme I
|G1 |
E+P A
3BM
CBSa in [Kang et al. 2004]
3|G1 |
3E
2E+3BM +2P A
Scheme II
|G1 | + 2|ZZp | 4E+BM +P A 3E+2BM +P A

Table 2: Security Level Comparison
Scheme
Security
CBS in [Li et al. 2007]
Normal AI and AII
Scheme I
Normal AI and Super AII
CBSa in [Kang et al. 2004]
Strong AI and AII
Scheme II
Super AI and AII

5.4

Eﬃciency Comparison

We now make a comparison among existing certiﬁcate-based signature schemes,
which are proposed in [Liu et al. 2008, Li et al. 2007, Kang et al. 2004]4 .
When compared to schemes (e.g. the ﬁrst scheme in [Liu et al. 2008]) without
bilinear mapping, our Scheme I and Scheme II have more computational cost
but shorter signature length. When compared to schemes (e.g. the second scheme
in [Liu et al. 2008]) whose security is proved without random oracles, Scheme I
and Scheme II have advantages of shorter system parameter, less computational
cost and shorter signature length. The comparison among other schemes with
similar constructions as ours is shown in Table 1 and Table 2. The notations in
Table 1 are as follows: |G1 | and |ZZp | denote the bit length of an element in G1
and ZZp , respectively; E denotes the exponentiation in G1 ; BM and P A denote
the bilinear mapping operation and point addition in G1 , respectively.
As shown in Table 2, Scheme I and CBS in [Li et al. 2007] have the similar security level (To be more precisely, our Scheme I is provably secure against Normal
AI and Super AII , and CBS in [Li et al. 2007] is provably secure against Normal
AI and AII ), while Scheme I has less computational operation and shorter signature length . The certiﬁcate-based signature scheme CBSa in [Kang et al. 2004]
is secure against the adversary similar to the strong adversary deﬁned in this
paper, while Scheme II is secure against the super adversary with comparable
computational cost and signature length. In addition, the two pairing operations
ˆ
(e(P, P ) and e(CB−mpk, H0 (ID)))
in Scheme II can be computed in an oﬀ-line
manner, which can further improve the eﬃciency of Scheme II. The compari4

As the notion of certiﬁcate-based signatures is relatively new, those are the only
known certiﬁcate-based signature schemes with formal security analysis.
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son shows that by applying our generic construction to eﬃcient certiﬁcateless
signature schemes, one can obtain new certiﬁcate-based signature schemes with
better performance than existing ones.

6

Conclusion

The focus of this paper was on certiﬁcate-based signatures. We demonstrated
the pros and the cons of certiﬁcate-based signatures, by comparing it with digital
signatures in other popular public key systems. Then, we deﬁned several new
types of adversaries and gave a new security model of certiﬁcate-based signatures. Our model is more elaborated by comparison with other existing security
models of certiﬁcate-based signatures. We proposed a generic construction of
certiﬁcate-based signatures from certiﬁcateless signatures. Our generic construction is secure (in the random oracle model) under the security model proposed
in this paper if the underlying certiﬁcateless signature scheme satisﬁes certain
security notions. Finally, we gave two concrete instances (with diﬀerent security
levels) of our generic constructions.
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